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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the fairness and the redistributive effects of personal income 
tax (PIT) in seven Central and Eastern European countries, namely: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania. Following Kakwani and Lambert (1998) 
methodology, we test tax equity and progressivity. We study the asymmetry of salary income 
distribution in order to examine the horizontal equity among individuals in the same group. We 
calculate the Gini coefficients in order to investigate the redistributive effects of PIT regulatory 
frameworks. We find that tax equity is fulfilled by all countries. However, PIT regulations does not 
allow for strong progressivity and for redistributive effects.             
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1.Introduction 
It has been to a great concern to the governments to find means and methods to raise taxes from the 
citizens in a fair and efficient way. In this sense, the economic theory asserts the benefit principle, which 
in a very simplified way it argues that those who benefit more from the government expenditures 
should pay more taxes to support such expenditures. From this perspective, fees and charges are the 
most appropriate forms of government finance (Hyman, 2011).  The great advantage of this approach 
is that it links the cost per unit of the government provided services with their marginal benefits, which 
results in a Lindahl equilibrium and avoids the free-rider problem. However, considering that, most 
of the government provided goods and services are non-excludable and/or non-rival, the assignment 
to individuals is problematic, and it makes the benefit approach difficult to implement.     
In 1776, Adam Smith replaced the benefit rule with the principle of equity, which holds that “the subjects 
of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in 
proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively 
enjoy under the protection of the state”. Since its verbalization, this maxim has endangered significant 
controversy among scholars and politicians. Its importance is conferred by the fact that it has become 
an underlying rule of modern taxation systems. Governments nowadays uses the equity approach to 
assess the value of the taxes levied on individuals and as a mechanism to ensure the fairness and 
impartiality of tax distribution among citizens.  
Discussions on tax equity are expressed in terms of horizontal and/or vertical equity. Horizontal equity 
(HE) is conventionally defined as requiring equal fiscal treatment for equals, while the vertical equity 
(VE) is commonly viewed as an appropriate differentiation in the tax burden among unequal 
taxpayers. The main critiques which have been brought draw attention to the lack of a normative 
content of both concepts and to the difficulties in measuring and applying VE and HE. Although 
significant efforts have been made to address unresolved issues surrounding these two notions (King, 
1983; Kaplow, 1989; Slesnick, 1989; Musgrave, 1990; Duclos and Lambert, 2000; Auerbach and 
Hassett, 2002; Galbiati and Vertova, 2008), the properties and the normative content of this principle 
have not been entirely clarified. 
The economic theory on social preferences has suggested that people feature a self-centered inequity 
aversion in the sense that they do not care about inequity itself, but they are interested in their own 
payoffs related to others’ payoffs (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). More recently, Alm, Kirchler and 
Muehlbacher (2012) have pointed toward a citizens’ pronounced sense of justice when complying with 
taxes. They identified three forms of justice that strongly influence the tax compliance: distributive 
justice which relates to the horizontal and vertical equity and exchange fairness; procedural justice 
connected with  the fairness of procedures for making tax decisions; and redistributive justice which 
refers to the fairness of the form and severity of the punishment imposed. In general, tax legislation 
creates inequity among people (Plotnick, 1981) and considering that it was mentioned before, an unfair 
tax system can cause unsatisfaction among taxpayers, which, eventually, can lead to tax avoidance or 
tax evasion and affects not only Government’s ability to raise revenues, but also economic stabilization 
and income redistribution (Dean, Keenan and Kenney, 1980). 
The general wisdom favors the progressivity in taxation as opposed to proportionality or regressivity 
as the most appropriate mean in fulfilling tax equity (Ifanti, 2008). Our view diverges to some extent 
3 
 
from this perspective in the sense that we believe that the economists have to make a clear distinction 
between tax equity and the redistributive effects of taxes. Besides being the principal mean of 
collecting government revenues, taxation is also a powerful tool that affects the distribution of 
incomes in one economy. Economists who studied tax equity took into consideration the joint 
hypothesis of progressivity and redistribution as evidences of fairness of taxation systems. However, 
we believe that income redistribution is a political option and the selection of the tax schemes 
(proportional, progressive or regressive), which lead to more or less inequalities, depends on 
governments’ agendas. Therefore, tax equity and the redistributive effects of a tax schedule should be 
studied independently and not as parts of the same principle. Tax equity can be achieved even if the 
redistributive effects are poor.  
The aim of this paper is to shed more light on tax equity issues by studying the fairness and the 
redistributive effects of the PIT in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), namely Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania that use the flat tax rate. It is 
well known that its implementation can be often progressive depending on tax deductions, exemptions 
and allowances or tax reliefs that diminish the tax liability and increase the effective tax rate. Therefore, 
we use a threefold approach to conduct our analysis. Firstly, we examine if the PIT regulations fulfill 
the tax equity conditions. Secondly, we investigate whether the PIT regulatory frameworks promote 
or inhibit progressivity. Thirdly, we analyze the redistributive effects of PIT schedules using the Gini 
coefficients of the pre-and post-tax income. For these purposes, we use the existing PIT regulations 
as of 2016. The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the PIT 
frameworks in CEECs. Section 3 describes the methodology used. Section 4 reports the results and 
discusses the results. Section 5 emphasize the policy implications of our study and formulates the 
necessary recommendations.  
2. Personal Income Tax Regulations in CEECs1 
According to Tax Regulations in force in 2016, the seven countries under investigation have used the 
PIT flat tax rate. The lowest rate of 10% is applied in Bulgaria, while the highest rate of 23% is 
employed in Latvia. In this section, we present the main characteristics of the PIT regulations in what 
regards the tax allowances (social contributions, personal deductions), tax credits for dependents, tax 
rates etc. We focus only on the income earned from salary which is defined as the total amount of 
salaries, wages, benefits in kind and other income received by an individual from an employer, under 
an employment contract. 
2.1. Bulgaria 
Bulgarian residents pay taxes on the salary received. Tax allowances are related to social contributions 
and personal deductions. Employee’s total share of social contributions (consisting of contribution to 
pension fund, health insurance, unemployment fund and other additional mandatory social 
contributions) is of 12.9% of gross income. The monthly taxable base for social security contribution 
is capped at BGN 2,600 (equivalent of BGN 31,200/year). As regards the personal deductions allowed 
for tax purposes, employees may deduct from their annual taxable base the following amounts: (i) 
there is no deduction allowed for employees without dependent children; (ii) BGN 200 per each child, 
up to three minor children. Besides personal deductions, Bulgarian residents are also entitled to deduct 
                                                            
1 Information regarding the PIT regulatory frameworks in CEECs is extracted from EY (2016). 
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amounts for: mortgage interest, voluntary pension contributions or voluntary health and life insurance 
contributions made by individuals to authorized funds. The flat rate used for salary income taxation 
in Bulgaria is 10%. 
2.2. The Czech Republic 
The Czech residents are subject to PIT for their salary income. Social contributions due by employees 
are the only deductions allowed for personal income tax purposes. Employee’s total share of social 
contributions (consisting of contribution to old-age pension and health insurance) is of 11% of gross 
income. The monthly taxable base for social security contribution is capped at 4 times the monthly 
average salary (equivalent of CZK 1,296,288/year). Czech Republic is the only analysed CEEC where 
deductions for dependent persons are not granted because a tax relief is allowed. Thus, employees 
may decrease their annual tax liability with the following amounts, as tax credits: (i) CZK 24,840 as 
personal tax relief (employees without dependent children); (ii) CZK 13,404 for the first dependent 
child; (iii) CZK 17,004 for the second dependent child; (iv) CZK 20,604 for the third and each 
additional child. Other tax reliefs are also available for a spouse living in the same household with the 
taxpayer, for dependent disabled persons etc. But, total annual tax credit allowed for dependents may 
not exceed CZK 60,300. The flat tax rate for salary income in Czech Republic is 15%, but a solidarity 
surcharge of 7% applies to annual employment income exceeding 48 times the monthly average salary 
(equivalent of CZK 1,296,288 in 2016). 
2.3. Estonia 
Residents of Estonia are subject to PIT for their salary income. Employee’s total share of social 
contributions (consisting of mandatory pension fund and unemployment insurance) is of 3.6% of 
gross income. No ceiling applies to the amount of salary subject to social contributions and the 
amounts paid are recognized as tax allowances when computing PIT for salary income. The personal 
deductions are allowed for tax purposes, thus employees may deduct from their annual taxable base 
the following amounts: (i) EUR 2,040 as basic deduction (for employees with no dependents); (ii) 
EUR 1,848 per each child, beginning with the second child. Besides personal deductions, Estonian 
residents are also entitled to deduct amounts for: acquisition of voluntary pension fund units, training 
expenses for educating individuals and their dependents up to 26 years old, interest paid to credit 
institutions on housing loans. The standard income tax rate in Estonia is a flat rate of 20%.  
2.4. Hungary 
Hungarian residents are subject to PIT for their salary income. Each employee is subject to 18.5% 
social security contribution (as pension contribution, health care insurance and labor force 
contribution) on salary income. No employee pension contribution cap applies. The most significant 
personal deduction is represented by the family tax allowance, which applies without an income limit 
and decrease the annual taxable base, cumulated for both spouses, with the following amounts: (i) 
there is no deduction allowed for employees without dependent children; (ii) HUF 66,670/month for 
each child, for employees having one child; (iii) HUF 83,330/month for each child, for employees 
having two children; (iv) HUF 220,000/month for each child, for employees having three or more 
children. It is to be noticed that the family tax allowance is much lower for dependents, other than 
minor children. Other tax allowances are insignificant. A 15% flat PIT rate applies to employment 
income. 
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2.5. Latvia 
Residents are subject to Latvian PIT for their salary income. Tax allowances mainly consist of social 
contributions and tax deductions. Employees make social security contributions on monthly salaries 
at general rate of 10.5% (including contributions for pension funds, unemployment contribution and 
other additional mandatory social contributions). As personal deductions allowed for tax purposes, 
employees may deduct from their annual taxable base the following amounts: (i) EUR 75/month as 
basic deduction for employees without dependent children; (ii) EUR 175/month for each child. 
Besides personal deductions, Latvian residents are also entitled to deduct amounts for: contributions 
to private pension funds and to life insurance schemes, medical expenses and expenses for 
professional education, up to an annual threshold, etc. Income tax at a basic flat rate of 23% applies 
to salary income.     
2.6. Lithuania 
Residents employed by Lithuanian companies are subject to PIT for their salaries. Employers must 
withhold social security contributions at a rate of 3% from an employee’s gross salary, but it is not 
deductible when calculating the amount of PIT to be withheld from the employee’s gross payroll. The 
total share of employee’s social contributions is of 9% (also including healthcare insurance, which is 
deductible for tax purposes). Each taxpayer earning salary income is entitled to receive a tax allowance 
by decreasing the monthly taxable base with a basic personal deduction, computed based on the 
amount of gross income (GI), using the following formula: 200 – 0.34 × (GI – 350). Individuals who 
have dependent children are also allowed to an additional deduction of EUR 60/month/child, for 
each child and for each parent. Lithuanian residents earning salary income may also deduct amounts 
related to: contributions to pension funds, cumulative life insurance premiums, expenses for 
vocational training and studies etc. The flat tax rate applied for salary income taxation in Lithuania is 
15%.   
2.7. Romania   
Romanian residents earning salary income are subject to PIT. Tax allowances consist of social 
contributions and personal deductions. The total share of employee’s social contributions is of 16.5% 
(including social security contribution, healthcare insurance and unemployment contribution). 
Monthly taxable base for social security contribution is capped at 5 times the average gross salary 
(which is RON 13,405/month, equivalent of RON 160,860/year). Each taxpayer is entitled to a 
monthly personal deduction, set depending on the level of GI and number of dependents, as follows: 
(i) for individuals earning monthly GI less than RON 1,500: RON 300 for employees without 
dependent children; RON 400 for employees having one child; RON 500 for employees having two 
children; RON 600 for employees having three children; RON 800 for employees having four or more 
children; (ii) for individuals earning monthly GI between  RON 1,500 and RON 3,000: 300 × [1 – 
(GI – 1,500)/1,500] for employees without dependent children; 400 × [1 – (GI – 1,500)/1,500] for 
employees having one child; 500 × [1 – (GI – 1,500)/1,500] for employees having two children; 600 
× [1 – (GI – 1,500)/1,500] for employees having three children; (v) 800 × [1 – (GI – 1,500)/1,500] 
for employees having four or more children; (ii) for individuals earning monthly GI between  higher 
than RON 3,000 no personal deduction is allowed. Additional deductions are also granted for: 
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contributions to private pension funds, private health insurance, trade union contributions. Salary 
income is subject to tax at a flat rate of 16%.   
3. Methodology 
For the purpose of our paper, we use a generated dataset2 for each country under investigation. There 
are several sound reasons for which we decided to use a generated dataset: (i) we can use a dataset 
which is not affected by tax avoidance or to any other assimilated practices. There is a number of 
studies that showed, for instance, the prevalence of envelope wages in former communist countries 
which represents an illegitimate wage arrangement used by formal employers aimed to help them to 
avoid paying full social contributions and tax liabilities (Sedleniesk, 2003; Williams, 2009; Meriküll and 
Staehr, 2010). (ii) we have the possibility to generate salary income which are symmetrically distributed 
around the mean salary of each group. (iii) we can study and emphasize more clearly the effects of 
PIT regulations on salary income without being restricted by a certain settlement of the existing 
salaries. 
We assume that our total population of taxpayers comprises 600 distinct individuals (𝑖 = 1,600̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) who 
earn salary income. We divided the 600 taxpayers into 6 distinct sub-groups of 100 individuals 
depending on their annual salary. The first group (G1) includes individuals earning salary income 
starting from the minimum annual salary up to the average annual salary. The following formula gives 
the pace of the increase in the salary among the individuals of the 1st group: 
(𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦) 100⁄ . The second group (G2) includes 
taxpayers who earn income that vary between the average annual salary and twice the average annual 
salary. The third group (G3) consists of individuals having income ranging from twice the average 
annual salary and three times the average annual salary. The fourth group (G4) comprises taxpayers 
who earn income varying from three times the average annual salary and fourth times the average 
annual salary. The fifth group (G5) includes individuals whose income vary from fourth to fifth times 
the average annual salary, and the sixth group (G6) comprises taxpayers who earn income that range 
from fifth to sixth times the average annual salary. The pace of the increase of salary income among 
the individuals of groups 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 is given by the following formula: 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦/
100. The annual salary (minimum / average) is calculated as: 12 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 × 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚/
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑦 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦. Table 1 in the Appendix summarizes the information that has be taken 
into consideration for tax calculation purposes. 
For an identical approach, we have chosen to take into consideration only the tax allowance (or tax 
credit for the particular case of Czech Republic) related to personal deductions for dependent children 
(other deductions are not available for residents of all analyzed CEECs). For this reason, we assume 
that each individual of the population of 600 can be in one of the following circumstances: S0 - 
employee without dependent children; S1 - employee having one dependent child; S2 – employee with 
two dependent children;  S3 – employee with three dependent children; S4 – employee with four or 
more dependent children. 
So, we examine how persons belonging to the same income group (earning similar salaries) and having 
similar social conditions (number of dependent children) are treated from taxation perspective.                           
                                                            
2 The dataset is available upon request. 
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For the purposes of our study, we describe the methodology in two distinct sub-sections: (i) one 
devoted to the analysis of tax equity and progressivity of the PIT regulatory frameworks in CEECs; 
(ii) one assigned to the examination of the redistributive effects of the PIT schedules in CEECs. 
3.1. Tax equity and progressivity 
For this purpose, we develop upon the framework introduced by Kakwani and Lambert (1998) who 
defined the equity in income taxation by means of three axioms. We assume Xi pre-tax salary income 
of individual i, and Ti the tax liability. The axioms are described below: 
𝐴1: 𝑋𝑖 ≥ 𝑋𝑗 , 𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑇𝑗           (1) 
𝐴2: 𝑋𝑖 ≥ 𝑋𝑗 , 𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑇𝑗 ⇒
𝑇𝑖
𝑋𝑖
≥
𝑇𝑗
𝑋𝑗
         (2) 
𝐴3: 𝑋𝑖 ≥ 𝑋𝑗 , 𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑇𝑗 ,
𝑇𝑖
𝑋𝑖
≥
𝑇𝑗
𝑋𝑗
⇒ 𝑋𝑖 − 𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑋𝑗 − 𝑇𝑗       (3) 
The first axiom (A1), which corresponds to a minimal progression, says that tax should increase 
monotonically according to people’s ability to pay. The second axiom (A2) tests the progressivity 
principle in the sense that richer people must pay higher taxes. In the case that these two axioms are 
fulfilled, the third axiom (A3) checks if taxation does not cause a re-ranking in people’s living standards 
and it can be seen as a vertical restriction ruling out too much progressivity.  
In order to test the three axioms, we calculate the median of the pre-tax salary income3 (𝑋𝐺𝑘
̃ ), of the 
tax due (𝑇𝐺𝑘
̃ ) and of the after-tax salary income4 (𝑋𝐺𝑘 − 𝑇𝐺𝑘
̃ ) for each group Gk, where 𝑘 = 1,6̅̅ ̅̅   and 
for each of the corresponding situation described by S0 to S4. We use the median in order to avoid 
the potential asymmetries generated by the PIT regulations in the distribution of the pre- or after-tax 
salary income or of the taxes paid. We make comparisons between the groups of individuals. We say 
that axioms 1 to 3 are fulfilled if the following conditions are met: 
𝐶1: 𝑋𝐺𝑚
̃ > 𝑋𝐺𝑛
̃ ⇒ 𝑇𝐺𝑚
̃ > 𝑇𝐺𝑛
̃          (4) 
𝐶2: 𝑋𝐺𝑚
̃ > 𝑋𝐺𝑛
̃ , 𝑇𝐺𝑚
̃ > 𝑇𝐺𝑛
̃ ⇒
𝑇𝐺𝑚
̃
𝑋𝐺𝑚
̃
>
𝑇𝐺𝑛
̃
𝑇𝐺𝑛
̃
        (5) 
𝐶3: 𝑋𝐺𝑚
̃ > 𝑋𝐺𝑛
̃ , 𝑇𝐺𝑚
̃ > 𝑇𝐺𝑛
̃ ,
𝑇𝐺𝑚
̃
𝑋𝐺𝑚
̃
>
𝑇𝐺𝑛
̃
𝑇𝐺𝑛
̃
⇒ (𝑋𝐺𝑚 − 𝑇𝐺𝑚
̃ ) > (𝑋𝐺𝑛 − 𝑇𝐺𝑛
̃ )   (6) 
Compared to the original three axioms of Kakwani and Lambert who allowed for HE, our three 
conditions do not permit it because we assumed that the 600 individuals earn totally different salary  
incomes and, therefore, the medians of the pre-tax, after-tax salary income and of the tax paid will be 
different for each group and increasing. By testing the three conditions, we examine only the VE 
principle, and we investigate tax equity between groups of people. 
                                                            
3We calculate the pre-tax salary income as difference between the gross salary and social contributions.  
 
4 We calculate the after-tax salary income as difference between the pre-tax salary income and tax due. 
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In order to study the inequities among the individuals comprising the same group, we check if the 
distribution of taxes paid and of post-tax salary income is symmetric. Because the pre-tax salary 
income is symmetrically distributed as we purposely generated it, applying the PIT regulatory 
frameworks should lead to a symmetric distribution of the post-tax salary income. Thus, we calculate 
the skewness of taxes distribution (𝛾𝑇𝐺𝑘
) and of the after-tax salary income distribution (𝛾(𝑋−𝑇)𝐺𝑘
) 
within each group of individuals, using the equations described below:  
𝛾𝑇𝐺𝑘
= 𝐸 [(
𝑇𝑖𝐺𝑘
−𝜇𝑇𝐺𝑘
𝜎𝑇𝐺𝑘
)]
𝐺𝑘
         (7) 
𝛾(𝑋−𝑇)𝐺𝑘
= 𝐸 [(
(𝑋−𝑇)𝑖𝐺𝑘
−𝜇(𝑋−𝑇)𝐺𝑘
𝜎(𝑋−𝑇)𝐺𝑘
)]
𝐺𝑘
       (8) 
where, 𝑇/(𝑋 − 𝑇)𝑖𝐺𝑘
 represents the tax paid/after-tax salary income received by individual i 
belonging to group Gk; 𝜇𝑡/(𝑋−𝑇)𝐺𝑘
 is the mean of the taxes paid/after-tax salaries income received by 
individuals in group Gk; 𝜎𝑇/(𝑋−𝑇)𝐺𝑘
 is the standard deviation of the taxes paid/after-tax salary income 
received by individuals in group Gk; 𝑘 = 1,6̅̅ ̅̅ ; E is the expectation operator. 
If the PIT regulations does not generate any inequity among the individuals comprising the same 
group of income, the condition 4 (C4) has to be fulfilled: 
𝐶4: 𝛾𝑋𝐺𝑘
= 0, 𝛾𝑇𝐺𝑘
= 0 ⇒ 𝛾(𝑋−𝑇)𝐺𝑘
= 0       (9) 
where, 𝛾𝑋𝐺𝑘
 is the skewness of the pre-tax salary income distribution. 
3.2.Redistributive effects  
For the study of the redistributive effects of the PIT regulatory frameworks, we calculate the Gini 
coefficient of the pre- tax (𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝐺𝑘
′ ) and after-tax (𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝐺𝑘
′′ ) salary income for each group of individuals 
of the corresponding situations described in section 3.1. It is generally accepted that the Gini 
coefficient represents the most commonly used measure of income inequality. Gini coefficient takes 
values between 0 and 1. A Gini coefficient of zero expresses perfect equality of income distribution, 
whilst a Gini coefficient of 1 shows maximal inequality of income distribution. As for the income to 
be equal distributed among people, Gini coefficients should be closer to zero. If the PIT regulations 
contribute to an equal distribution of income, Gini coefficient of the after-tax salary income is smaller 
than the Gini coefficient of the pre-tax salary income. In the case that both Gini coefficients are equal 
then the PIT regulatory framework does not contribute to the redistribution of income. If Gini 
coefficient of the pre-tax income is smaller than Gini coefficient of the after-tax income then the PIT 
leads to unequal redistribution of income. Therefore, we test the following hypothesis: 
H1: PIT regulatory framework has redistributive effects on the equal distribution of salary income 
against the null hypothesis: 
H0: PIT regulatory framework has no redistributive effects on the distribution of the salary income 
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If 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝐺𝑘
′′ < 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝐺𝑘
′ , then we accept H1 and reject the null hypothesis. If 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝐺𝑘
′ = 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝐺𝑘
′′ , then we 
accept the null hypothesis and reject the alternative one. 
In order to analyze the magnitude of the redistributive effects, we calculate the percentage change of 
the Gini coefficient as described by the equation below: 
∆%𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 =
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝐺𝑘
′′ −𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝐺𝑘
′
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝐺𝑘
′ ∙ 100        (10) 
 
4.Results and discussions 
4.1.Tax equity and progressivity 
In order to examine if PIT regulatory frameworks satisfy the principle of tax equity and if they promote 
progressivity, we test conditions C1, C2, and C3 using the dataset generated according to the description 
in section 3. If these conditions are confirmed, then the axioms A1, A2, and A3 are also validated. For 
these purposes, we calculated the descriptive statistics of the pre- and after-tax salary income and of 
taxes paid by the individuals. Tables 2a to 2e in the Appendix report the results in this sense for each 
group of persons and for the corresponding situation of the number of dependent children.  
Condition C1 is tested by making comparison of the pre-tax salary income and of the amount of taxes 
paid as an effect of the PIT regulations. The results show that the value of tax increases with the 
increase in the value of the pre-tax salary income. Thus, condition C1 is met and we can state that 
axiom A1 is fulfilled. This implies that PIT regulations in CEECs satisfy the principle of equity 
irrespective of the number of dependent children. 
In order to verify condition C2, and, hence the fulfillment of axiom A2, we calculate the effective tax 
rates for each group of individuals. The effective tax rates are calculated as ratio between the median 
of tax paid on salary income over the median of the pre-tax salary income. Table 3 in the Appendix 
reports the results. We can observe mixed results. For employees without dependent children, the 
results indicate no progressivity for Bulgaria’s and Hungary’s cases because no tax deductions are 
granted for employees having no dependent children (social contributions calculated as share of gross 
salary income are the only tax allowances. For Lithuania and Romania, the PIT regulatory frameworks 
generates some progressivity for the individuals included in groups G1 and G2. For the people earning 
income higher than twice the average annual salary, although the pre-tax income increases and the tax 
increases as well (as it was shown by condition C1), the effective tax rates remains flat. This is the 
consequence of granting tax deductions only for employees earning salary income up to a threshold, 
which is found for both countries in G2 group of incomes. Starting with G3 group of income, because 
no tax deductions are allowed, the situation is similar with Bulgaria and Hungary. For Czech Republic, 
Estonia and Latvia, we observe progressivity. This is due to the fact that personal tax deductions (or 
tax credits for the particular case of Czech Republic) are allowed for the employee him/herself, even 
if there are no dependent children, for all employees in G1 – G6 groups.  When employees have 
dependent children, we observe more progressivity as an effect of the PIT regulations applicable in 
the CEECs, with only one exception: Romania’s case. For this country, we observe again progressivity 
only for the groups G1 and G2 for the same reason: only employees in group G1 and part of the 
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employees in group G2 may benefit of tax deductions for dependent children. For Bulgaria, the low 
amount used for tax purposes as tax deduction for dependent children generates smooth progressivity. 
For other five countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania), significant 
progressivity may be observed, due to the significant amounts allowed as tax deductions (or tax credits 
for Czech Republic). It is clearly demonstrated that the progressivity increases if the number of 
dependent children is higher and the amount used as tax deduction / tax credit is higher. Therefore, 
we can state that axiom A2 regarding progressivity of taxation is not fulfilled by the PIT regulatory 
frameworks in all CEECs and for all groups of individuals.  
Condition C3 is verified by comparing the medians of the pre-tax and after-tax salary income as they 
are reported in Tables 2a to 2e. We observe that the after-tax salary income increases with the increase 
of the pre-tax salary income and of taxes. Even if the progressivity principle stated by axiom A2 is not 
entirely satisfied, the PIT regulations in CEECs do not cause any re-ranking in people’s living 
standards. 
Examining the skewness of the pre-tax salary income (𝛾𝑋𝐺𝑘
), of taxes (𝛾𝑇𝐺𝑘
) and of the after-tax salary 
income (𝛾(𝑋−𝑇)𝐺𝑘
) for each group, Gk, and for the corresponding situation of the number of 
dependent children reported in Tables 2a to 2e from the Appendix, we observe a persistency of the 
asymmetry in the distribution of taxes and of the after-tax salary income for Romania, the Czech 
Republic and Lithuania. The skewness is different from zero, but close to zero. Taking into 
consideration that the pre-tax salary income is symmetrically distributed around the mean of each 
group and the skewness is zero5, then the change in the distribution of the after-tax salary income 
determined by the PIT regulations in these countries is significant. These results suggest the existence 
of some inequities in the way the PIT regulations contribute to the redistribution of the individuals’ 
income taking part in the two groups.  
                                                            
5 Bulgaria is the only exception. The gross salary income is symmetrically distributed, but the pre-tax salary income 
distribution is positively skewed because the social contributions are capped.  
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In Romania’s case, the distribution of tax liability for G1 is positively skewed, whilst the distribution 
of the after-tax income is negatively skewed. For G2, the asymmetry of tax liability is negative and the 
asymmetry of the after-tax salary income is positive. The asymmetry is smaller for G1 than for G2, 
which means that the inequity is lower among individuals in this group. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the 
pre-, tax and after-tax salary income for individuals in groups G1 and G2. 
 
We can see for G1 there is less individuals who have after-tax salary income which is close to the pre-
tax salary income because of large tax deductions they benefit from and which contribute to a 
significant decrease in tax liability. For the most part of individuals taking part in G1, tax deductions 
are much lower and therefore the tax liability is higher and shifts the distribution of the salary income 
to the left. In the case of G2, the differences in the tax liability incurred by individuals of this group 
are not very high because the tax deductions are not high and a small number of individuals benefit 
from tax deductions, which shifts tax distribution to the left and after-tax salary income distribution 
to the right. Experts on taxation, please, make more comments if you consider necessary! We meet 
the same situation for employees having dependent children. The main difference is represented by 
the increasing asymmetry what it suggests that inequity is higher. The highest asymmetry we observe 
in the situation of employees with four or more dependent children. This is again the consequence of 
digressive tax deductions (based on a computation formula, not fixed amounts), allowed only up to 
an annual income of RON 36,000, which is found in group G2 of incomes, no matter the number of 
dependent children. For groups G3 to G6, we do not notice asymmetries in after-tax salary income 
distribution which implies that tax rules are fair for all individuals in these groups, regardless of the 
number of children because no tax deductions are granted. If we consider the groups, Gk, to represent 
people with a similar economic situation in terms of salary income (from lowest to highest) then 
asymmetry is a way to analyze horizontal equity. Therefore, we can state that tax rules generate 
horizontal inequity among low-salary income individuals. 
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In the case of the Czech Republic, we notice greater asymmetry than in the case of Romania. It can 
be noticed that the Czech Republic is the only CEEC that uses tax credit for tax purposes, which is a 
more powerful incentive than the tax deduction, because it decreases directly the tax liability instead 
of the taxable base, before taxation. Asymmetry occurs in the distribution of G1 after-tax salary income 
to employees without and with one dependent child and in the distribution of G2 after-tax salary 
income to employees with two and more dependent children. This is due to the fact that, for each of 
the situations stated, the tax liability is changing from zero (for a significant number of employees in 
that group) to a positive amount, which, of course, generates asymmetry. Skewness could not be 
calculated for G1 after-tax salary income to employees with more than two dependent children because 
the tax liability is zero. However, the asymmetry of after-tax salary income distribution is zero what it 
suggests the absence of tax inequity. Figures 3 and 4 show the pre-, tax and the after-tax salary income 
for group G1 employees without dependent children and with one dependent child.   
 
33% of employees without dependent children in G1 benefit from total tax credit and thus tax liability 
is zero. In this situation, the pre and after-tax salary income are the same. The rest of the individuals 
in the group have a variable tax credit, which makes the tax liability to increase. The after-tax income 
is lower than the pre-tax salary income. These make the distribution of taxes to be positively skewed 
and the distribution of after-tax salary income to be negatively skewed. In the case of G1 employees 
with one dependent child the share of those who benefit from total tax credit is 90%, which makes 
the distribution of the tax liability to be more positively skewed. In the end, the asymmetry in the 
after-tax distribution decreases what can be interpreted as contributing to greater horizontal tax equity. 
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For employees with more than two dependent children, the asymmetry in the distribution of tax 
liability and after-tax salary income appears for the group G2 with incomes varying between the 
average annual salary and twice the average annual salary. Figures 5, 6 and 7 illustrate the pre-, tax and 
the after-tax salary income for group G2 employees with two and more dependent children. 
 
The number of individuals benefiting from total tax credit is of 27 in the case the employees with two 
dependent children and of 39 in the case of employees with three and more dependent children 
because the tax credit is capped to a maximum annual amount of CZK 60,300, no matter the number 
of dependents. The rest of individuals benefit from tax credits which makes the after-tax salary income 
to be lower than the pre-tax salary income. This fact leads to a positive asymmetry in the distribution 
of the tax liability and as a result to a negative asymmetry in the distribution of the after-tax salary 
income. Therefore, we can interpret these results as evidence of the existence of tax inequities 
generated by the PIT regulations. For groups G3 to G6, we have not found evidence of horizontal 
inequity. The PIT regulatory framework does not affect the distribution of the after-tax salary income 
for high salaries. 
For the case of Lithuania, we observe the same persistence of after-tax salary income distribution for 
individuals in group G2, regardless on the number of dependent children. Asymmetry is positive as a 
result of a negative skewed distribution of tax liability. The skewness of the after-tax salary income 
distribution is the same regardless of the number of dependent children because the personal tax 
deductions allowed are digressive, calculated based on a formula, not stated as fixed amounts. 20 
employees in G2 benefit of personal tax deductions, while for the rest of the group there is no personal 
tax deduction allowed when calculating the income tax, no matter the number of dependents. Only 
the tax deduction for dependent children is allowed for all groups of employees, depending on the 
number of dependents. It indicates the existence of horizontal inequity among individuals in this 
group. For employees with more than four dependent children the, we found negative asymmetry in 
the distribution of after-tax salary income for group G2. For the rest of groups, PIT regulations do 
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not change how salary income is distributed, which suggests the existence of horizontal equity among 
individuals in the same group. 
For Hungary, we found negatively skewed distribution of after-tax salary income for employees in 
G2 and G3 groups with three or more dependent children. This situation is caused by the way in which 
tax deductions are granted in this country.  For example, the tax liability of employees with three 
dependent children is zero for all those earning income ranging from minimum salary to average 
annual salary. The situation is similar, too, for employees with more than three dependent children 
who receive annual salary income of up to twice the average annual salary. For individuals in these 
situations, the PIT regulations do not change the distribution of after-tax salary income that remains 
symmetric.  For the other groups, the results show no evidence of horizontal inequity. 
In Estonia’s case, the results show a negative asymmetry in the distribution of the after-tax salary 
income for employees in G1 with three and more than three dependent children. The minimum tax 
liability is zero. 10 employees with three dependent children have zero tax liability because of the high 
level of tax deductions, exceeding the taxable base (the pre-tax salary income). For 32 employees with 
four and more dependent children, the tax deductions are higher than the pre-tax salary income. Thus, 
the tax liability is zero. Therefore, the skewness of the distribution of taxes is higher for employees 
with four dependent children. For the rest of the groups, PIT regulatory framework does not cause 
tax inequities among individuals.  
Latvia is in a similar situation to Estonia, with the exception that the negative asymmetry of the 
distribution of the after-tax salary income shows up for employees with two and three dependent 
children in group G1. 22 employees with two dependent children has zero tax liability, while 61 
employees with three dependent children benefit from of tax deductions higher than the taxable base 
(the pre-tax salary income). Skewness of tax distribution is higher for employees with three dependent 
children, and, consequently, the after-tax salary income is more negatively skewed. Horizontal tax 
inequity is lower for employees with two dependent children. We have not found any other tax 
inequity among individuals in other groups.  
Bulgaria is the only country where PIT regulations do not cause any horizontal inequity among 
individuals in the same group with one exception: for employees in group G3 regardless of the number 
of dependent children, the pre-tax salary income is asymmetrically distributed. This is caused by the 
way how social contributions are calculated and that generates this asymmetry. The social security 
contribution is capped at BGN 31,200/year and this level of gross income is found in group G3, 
meaning that after exceeding this threshold, the total amount of social contributions increases, but at 
a lower rate. The gross salary income is symmetrically distributed and taxes do not change the 
distribution of the after-tax salary income. 
4.2.Redistributive effects  
In order to analyze the redistributive effects of PIT regulations in CEECs, we test hypotheses H0 and 
H1 by calculating the Gini coefficients of pre- and after-tax salary income and comparing them as 
described in section 3.2. We also calculate the percentage change of Gini coefficients to see the 
magnitude of the redistributive effects. We do the calculations for all individuals and for each group. 
Table 4 in the Appendix reports the results.  
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We can observe the largest redistributive effect in the case of the Czech Republic. The magnitude 
of the effect on the salary income of all individuals varies between 4.45% and 6.28%. The smallest 
effect is for employees without dependent children and the biggest effect is for employees with three 
and more dependent children. The results show that the Gini coefficients decrease which suggests an 
increase in the equality in the distribution of salary income. We also notice significant redistributive 
effects for all groups of individuals. This is explained by the fact that for the Czech Republic the results 
showed a more pronounced progressive taxation system than in other CEECs countries. Given that 
in this country the flat tax rate is applied, the progressivity is the effect of other PIT regulations. 
Another important aspect is that the second largest redistributive effect appears for individuals in 
group G5 earning income that varies from fourth to fifth times the average annual salary.  
The second most redistributive PIT regulatory framework is that of Latvia. The magnitude of effects 
varies between 0.93% for employees without dependent children and 7.30% for employees with four 
and more dependent children. The redistribution of the salary income is accomplished for all groups 
of individuals even though the magnitude differs. The biggest effects are met for people in groups G1, 
G2 and G3, while for groups G4, G5 and G6 the redistribution decreases. The redistributive effects 
can also be attributed to greater progressivity of taxation. The effective tax rate varies significantly 
among groups of individuals.  
The redistributive effects in Estonia’s, Hungary’s and Lithuania’s cases are comparable in 
magnitude, the results being quite close. The effects are not too large, but not too small either. The 
redistribution is achieved for all groups of employees.     
The smallest redistributive effects can be noticed for Bulgaria’s case. The magnitude of the effect 
varies between 0% and 0.21% for the all individuals’ salary income. This means that the inequality of 
the income distribution slightly changes and that the PIT regulatory framework does not have 
redistributive effects due to poor progressivity of taxation. For employees without dependent children, 
there is no redistributive effect in their salary income. This is because they do not benefit from tax 
deductions or exemptions and, therefore, the effective tax rate equals the flat statutory tax rate which 
does not vary among groups of individuals. Some redistributive effects can be observed for employees 
with one dependent child and more than one dependent children. This is can be explained by the fact 
that PIT regulatory framework allows weak progressivity. The effective tax rate ranges around 9%  
and the changes from one group to another are very small.  The largest redistributive effects are seen 
for individuals in group G1.  
The second smallest redistributive effect has been observed for Romania. The percentage change of 
Gini coefficients ranges from 0.34% to 0.93%. This indicates small changes in the inequality of salary 
income distribution. Unlike Bulgaria’s case, the redistribution is accomplished for individuals in groups 
G1 and G2. For the rest of groups, the results show no redistributive effects regardless of number of 
dependent children. The observed redistributive effects for G1 and G2 can also be correlated with the 
progressivity of the effective tax rate which occurs only for these groups. For groups G2 to G6, the 
effective tax rate is similar to the statutory tax rate. This implies that no tax deductions or exemptions 
are granted for employees within these groups. 
When analyzing the results on redistributive effects, we believe that it is important to take into account 
the results on tax equity, too, because reducing inequality in income distribution can be affected by 
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unfair PIT regulations. Table 5 in the Appendix summarizes the results on the redistributive effects 
captured by the percentage change in the coefficients and tax equity measured by skewness. We are 
interested in those situations where the redistribution determined by the PIT regulatory frameworks 
is accompanied by horizontal inequity among individuals in the group. In this respect, we have found 
for Romania that in 10 situations when redistribution is achieved is associated with unfair PIT 
regulations which generates horizontal inequity among employees in the same group. Considering that 
10 is the maximum number of situations when distribution is accomplished, we can state that Romania 
has the most unfair redistribution. The increasing equality in the distribution of salary income takes 
place at a cost of horizontal inequity. Estonia and Latvia are the countries with the lowest ratio 
between unfair redistribution and total redistribution situations. The ratio is of 0.07. Then we can 
mention Hungary with the second lowest ratio. Bulgaria and the Czech Republic have higher ratios 
of unfair redistributive effects of 0.17 and respectively, of 0.19 while Lithuania is the second among 
CEECs with the biggest ratio between unfair redistributive effects and total redistributive effects. We 
can also note that the unfair redistributive effects occurs for people in the first two groups with income 
ranging from the minimum annual salary to twice the average annual salary. Only in Bulgaria’s case, 
the unfair redistribution is achieved for employees in group G3 about which we have already argued. 
 
5.Policy implications and recommendations 
We believe that based on the results of our study several policy implications can be formulated. But, 
before discussing them, we would like to show that revenue collected by governments of CEECs from 
the personal income tax have a smaller share to total tax revenue. Table 6 in the Appendix reports the 
breakdown of tax revenue by country in 2016. The taxes on individual or household income in CEECs 
represent about half of the value recorded at EU28. Latvia and Estonia have the biggest share. If we 
compare it to the value added type taxes, we can see that the latter have a much higher value than the 
one registered at EU28. These results suggest that PIT is not an important means of collecting revenue 
in CEECs. Governments seem to rely more on taxes on consumption than on income. Therefore, the 
importance of PIT might be underestimated. However, there are several reasons why PIT should be 
given much more attention by governments: (i) on one hand, it is widely recognized that taxes on 
income can have higher output gap elasticities than taxes on consumption especially when they reflect 
progressive rate structure for PIT (Baunsgaard and Symansky, 2009) which make them a better 
automatic stabilizer capable of converting periods of likely recession into periods of normal growth 
(Cohen and Follette, 2000); (ii) on other hand, PIT regulations can contribute to the decrease in the 
inequality of income distribution among people or households by promoting progressive taxation 
through tax rates structure or through other regulations as in the case of CEECs. Related to this 
aspect, Figure 8 illustrates Gini coefficients of disposable income in European Union countries for 
2016.  
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Source: Eurostat 
Although the Gini coefficients are not so high, we can observe that five CEECs, namely Estonia, 
Latvia, Romania, Lithuania and Bulgaria that report larger coefficients than of EU28 and euro area 
(EU19). Governments in these countries should be concerned about the fact that Gini coefficients 
are the four largest in EU (excepting Estonia). Our study revealed for Bulgaria and Romania that PIT 
regulations have the smallest redistributive effect due to weak progressivity. The Czech Republic and 
Hungary have lower Gini coefficients than of EU28 and euro area. The first has the third smallest 
coefficient among EU countries that indicates higher equality of income distribution. We remember 
that for the Czech Republic we found the biggest redistributive effects due to a stronger progressivity 
determined by PIT regulations in this country. Hungary is also one of the countries with important 
redistributive effects and with a pronounced progressivity especially for employees with more 
dependent children.  
Figure 9 depicts inequality of income distribution in 2015 in EU countries as quantile share ratios. We 
observe that biggest ratios for Romania, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Latvia and Estonia. The inequality in 
these countries is higher than of EU28 and euro area. Moreover, Romania, Lithuania and Bulgaria 
have the highest ratios among all EU countries. Hungary and the Czech Republic have ratios smaller 
than of EU28 and EU19 and the inequality in the Czech Republic was the second smallest in EU. 
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Source: Eurostat 
Taking into account all this evidence, we can state that governments of these countries should pay 
more attention to the problem of income redistribution and PIT regulations can be a very important 
and useful tool in achieving a more equal distribution of income in society. CEECs governments are 
rather concerned about tax-cuts for lower-income individuals to preserve their disposable income and 
purchasing power than about redistributive effects. If government would not want to change the flat 
tax rate and introduce a progressive tax rate schedule, the could use the tax deductions, tax allowances, 
tax exemptions or tax credits as means to achieve a stronger progressivity that can lead to more 
pronounced redistributive effects. The Czech Republic can be inspiring in doing so! 
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Appendix 
Table 1   Summary of the PIT regulations in CEECs 
 
 
 
 
 
Country (currency) Bulgaria (BGN) Czech Republic (CZK) Estonia (EUR) Hungary (HUF) Latvia (EUR) Lithuania (EUR) Romania (RON)
Monthly minimum salary 420 9,900 430 111,000 370 350 1,250
Monthly average salary 950 27,006 1146 244787 859 784 2,681
Annual minimum salary 5,040 118,800 5,160 1,332,000 4,440 4,200 15,000
Annual average salary 11,400 324,072 13,752 2,937,444 10,308 9,408 32,172
Total rate of employee's social contributions, out of which: 12.90% 11.00% 3.60% 18.50% 10.50% 9.00% 16.50%
- Social security contributions 7.90% 6.50% 2% 10.00% 7.51% 3% 10.50%
- Healthcare insurance contribution 3.20% 4.50% 0.00% 8.50% 6% 5.50%
- Unemployment contribution 0.40% 0.00% 1.60% 0.00% 0.65% 0% 0.50%
- Other social contributions 1.40% 0.00% 0% 0% 2.34% 0% 0.00%
Monthly threshold for social security contribution 2,600 - - - - 13,405
Annual threshold for social security contribution 31,200 1,296,288 - - - 160,860
Tax deduction allowed for dependent persons YES NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Tax credit for dependent persons NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
- Personal deduction /year (no children) 0 24,840 2,040 - 900 2,400-0.34×(GI-4,200) 3,600
- Personal deduction /year (one child) 200 38,244 2,040 400,020 3,000 2,400-0.34×(GI-4,200) +1,440/2 4,800
- Personal deduction /year (two children) 400 55,248 3,888 999,960 5,100 2,400-0.34×(GI-4,200) +1,440×2/2 6,000
- Personal deduction /year (three children) 600 75,852 5,736 3,960,000 7,200 2,400-0.34×(GI-4,200) +1,440×3/2 7,200
- Personal deduction /year (four or more children) 600 96,456 7,584 5,280,000 9,300 2,400-0.34×(GI-4,200)+1,440×4/2 9,600
Maximum threshold for annual tax deduction - 60,300 - - - - -
Tax rate 10% 15% 20% 15% 23% 15% 16%
Surcharge tax rate - 7% - - - -
Surcharge tax applied for income exceeding: 1,296,288 - - - -
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Table 2a   Descriptive statistics for pre-tax salary income, after-tax salary income and salary income tax  
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax
Mean 7159.6 716.0 6443.7 197078.0 6223.6 190854.4 9115.6 1415.1 7700.5 1739798.4 260969.8 1478828.7 6599.7 1310.9 5288.8 6191.6 732.2 5459.5 19694.3 2762.6 16931.7
Median 7159.6 716.0 6443.7 197078.0 4721.7 192356.3 9115.6 1415.1 7700.5 1739798.4 260969.8 1478828.7 6599.7 1310.9 5288.8 6191.6 732.2 5459.5 19694.3 2753.8 16940.5
St.dev 1623.3 162.3 1461.0 53537.1 6218.1 47575.9 2427.2 485.4 1941.8 383431.4 57514.7 325916.7 1539.0 354.0 1185.1 1388.8 293.0 1095.8 4201.9 820.0 3382.1
Minim 4389.8 439.0 3950.9 105732.0 0.0 105732.0 4974.2 586.8 4387.4 1085580.0 162837.0 922743.0 3973.8 707.0 3266.8 3822.0 232.2 3589.8 12525.0 1428.0 11097.0
Maxim 9929.4 992.9 8936.5 288424.1 18423.6 270000.5 13256.9 2243.4 11013.5 2394016.9 359102.5 2034914.3 9225.7 1914.9 7310.8 8561.3 1232.1 7329.1 26863.6 4175.7 22687.9
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.49865 -0.08900 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.04267 -0.01084
Mean 14943.7 1494.4 13449.4 434078.2 40271.7 393806.5 19951.7 3582.3 16369.3 3602995.4 540449.3 3062546.1 13884.6 2986.5 10898.2 12884.7 1987.6 10897.1 40429.7 6462.1 33967.7
Median 14943.7 1494.4 13449.4 434078.2 40271.7 393806.5 19951.7 3582.3 16369.3 3602995.4 540449.3 3062546.1 13884.6 2986.5 10898.2 12884.7 1996.4 10888.3 40429.7 6468.8 33961.0
St.dev 2880.7 288.1 2592.6 83676.1 12551.4 71124.7 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 398.6 2085.6 7793.5 1257.9 6535.9
Minim 10028.7 1002.9 9025.8 291308.3 18856.2 272452.1 13389.5 2269.9 11119.6 2417957.0 362693.6 2055263.5 9317.9 1936.1 7381.8 8646.9 1250.2 7396.7 27132.3 4229.0 22903.3
Maxim 19858.8 1985.9 17872.9 576848.2 61687.2 515160.9 26513.9 4894.8 21619.1 4788033.7 718205.1 4069828.7 18451.3 4036.8 14414.5 17122.6 2653.1 14469.5 53727.2 8596.4 45130.9
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 -0.09428 0.01669 0.00000 -0.02646 0.00488
Mean 24905.5 2490.6 22415.0 722502.3 83535.3 638967.0 33208.6 6233.7 26974.9 5997012.2 899551.8 5097460.4 23110.3 5108.4 18001.9 21446.0 3323.0 18123.1 67293.4 10766.9 56526.4
Median 24873.1 2487.3 22385.8 722502.3 83535.3 638967.0 33208.6 6233.7 26974.9 5997012.2 899551.8 5097460.4 23110.3 5108.4 18001.9 21446.0 3323.0 18123.1 67293.4 10766.9 56526.4
St.dev 2927.3 292.7 2634.6 83676.1 12551.4 71124.7 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 384.8 2098.9 7793.5 1247.0 6546.6
Minim 19958.1 1995.8 17962.3 579732.4 62119.9 517612.5 26646.4 4921.3 21725.1 4811973.9 721796.1 4090177.8 18543.6 4058.0 14485.6 17208.2 2666.3 14541.9 53995.9 8639.3 45356.5
Maxim 30025.2 3002.5 27022.7 865272.2 104950.8 760321.4 39770.8 7546.2 32224.6 7182050.6 1077307.6 6104743.0 27677.0 6158.7 21518.3 25683.8 3979.6 21704.3 80590.9 12894.5 67696.3
Skewness 0.03684 0.03684 0.03684 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Mean 35494.4 3549.4 31944.9 1010926.4 126799.0 884127.4 46465.5 8885.1 37580.4 8391029.1 1258654.4 7132374.7 32335.9 7230.3 25105.7 30007.3 4649.5 25357.8 94157.0 15065.1 79091.9
Median 35494.4 3549.4 31944.9 1010926.4 126799.0 884127.4 46465.5 8885.1 37580.4 8391029.1 1258654.4 7132374.7 32335.9 7230.3 25105.7 30007.3 4649.5 25357.8 94157.0 15065.1 79091.9
St.dev 3141.9 314.2 2827.8 83676.1 12551.4 71124.7 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 384.8 2098.9 7793.5 1247.0 6546.6
Minim 30133.5 3013.4 27120.2 868156.5 105383.5 762773.0 39903.4 7572.7 32330.7 7205990.7 1080898.6 6125092.1 27769.2 6179.9 21589.3 25769.5 3992.8 21776.6 80859.5 12937.5 67922.0
Maxim 40855.2 4085.5 36769.7 1153696.3 148214.4 1005481.9 53027.7 10197.5 42830.2 9576067.4 1436410.1 8139657.3 36902.6 8280.6 28622.0 34245.1 5306.1 28939.0 107454.5 17192.7 90261.8
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Mean 46324.4 4632.4 41691.9 1309988.1 183114.2 1126874.0 59722.5 11536.5 48186.0 10785046.0 1617756.9 9167289.1 41561.6 9352.2 32209.4 38568.6 5976.0 32592.6 121020.6 19363.3 101657.3
Median 46324.4 4632.4 41691.9 1309988.1 183114.2 1126874.0 59722.5 11536.5 48186.0 10785046.0 1617756.9 9167289.1 41561.6 9352.2 32209.4 38568.6 5976.0 32592.6 121020.6 19363.3 101657.3
St.dev 3141.9 314.2 2827.8 89787.3 20049.4 69737.9 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 384.8 2098.9 7793.5 1247.0 6546.6
Minim 40963.5 4096.4 36867.2 1156791.2 148905.5 1007885.7 53160.3 10224.1 42936.2 9600007.6 1440001.1 8160006.5 36994.9 8301.8 28693.1 34330.7 5319.4 29011.4 107723.1 17235.7 90487.4
Maxim 51685.2 5168.5 46516.7 1463185.1 217322.8 1245862.3 66284.6 12848.9 53435.7 11970084.3 1795512.6 10174571.7 46128.3 10402.5 35725.8 42806.4 6632.6 36173.8 134318.1 21490.9 112827.2
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Mean 57154.4 5715.4 51438.9 1619476.9 252222.5 1367254.4 72979.4 14187.9 58791.5 13179062.8 1976859.4 11202203.4 50787.3 11474.1 39313.2 47129.8 7302.5 39827.3 149590.1 23934.4 125655.7
Median 57154.4 5715.4 51438.9 1619476.9 252222.5 1367254.4 72979.4 14187.9 58791.5 13179062.8 1976859.4 11202203.4 50787.3 11474.1 39313.2 47129.8 7302.5 39827.3 149590.1 23934.4 125655.7
St.dev 3141.9 314.2 2827.8 89787.3 20049.4 69737.9 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 384.8 2098.9 8773.6 1403.8 7369.8
Minim 51793.5 5179.4 46614.2 1466280.0 218013.9 1248266.1 66417.2 12875.4 53541.8 11994024.5 1799103.7 10194920.8 46220.6 10423.7 35796.8 42892.0 6645.9 36246.1 134620.5 21539.3 113081.2
Maxim 62515.2 6251.5 56263.7 1772673.8 286431.2 1486242.7 79541.6 15500.3 64041.3 14364101.2 2154615.2 12209486.0 55354.0 12524.4 42829.5 51367.7 7959.2 43408.5 164559.8 26329.6 138230.2
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000G6
G1
S0: Employee without dependent childrenStatisticsGroup
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Table 2b   Descriptive statistics for pre-tax salary income, after-tax salary income and salary income tax  
 
 
 
 
Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax
Mean 7159.6 696.0 6463.7 197078.0 480.4 196597.7 9115.6 1415.1 7700.5 1739798.4 200966.8 1538831.7 6599.7 827.9 5771.8 6191.6 624.2 5567.5 19694.3 2633.1 17061.2
Median 7159.6 696.0 6463.7 197078.0 0.0 197078.0 9115.6 1415.1 7700.5 1739798.4 200966.8 1538831.7 6599.7 827.9 5771.8 6191.6 624.2 5567.5 19694.3 2621.4 17072.9
St.dev 1623.3 162.3 1461.0 53537.1 1197.9 52813.2 2427.2 485.4 1941.8 383431.4 57514.7 325916.7 1539.0 354.0 1185.1 1388.8 293.0 1095.8 4201.9 869.4 3332.9
Minim 4389.8 419.0 3970.9 105732.0 0.0 105732.0 4974.2 586.8 4387.4 1085580.0 102834.0 982746.0 3973.8 224.0 3749.8 3822.0 124.2 3697.8 12525.0 1236.0 11289.0
Maxim 9929.4 972.9 8956.5 288424.1 5019.6 283404.5 13256.9 2243.4 11013.5 2394016.9 299099.5 2094917.3 9225.7 1431.9 7793.8 8561.3 1124.1 7437.1 26863.6 4134.9 22728.8
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 2.53386 -0.03579 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.05313 -0.01471
Mean 14943.7 1474.4 13469.4 434078.2 26867.7 407210.5 19951.7 3582.3 16369.3 3602995.4 480446.3 3122549.1 13884.6 2503.5 11381.2 12884.7 1879.6 11005.1 40429.7 6459.9 33969.9
Median 14943.7 1474.4 13469.4 434078.2 26867.7 407210.5 19951.7 3582.3 16369.3 3602995.4 480446.3 3122549.1 13884.6 2503.5 11381.2 12884.7 1888.4 10996.3 40429.7 6468.8 33961.0
St.dev 2880.7 288.1 2592.6 83676.1 12551.4 71124.7 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 398.6 2085.6 7793.5 1261.5 6532.3
Minim 10028.7 982.9 9045.8 291308.3 5452.2 285856.1 13389.5 2269.9 11119.6 2417957.0 302690.6 2115266.5 9317.9 1453.1 7864.8 8646.9 1142.2 7504.7 27132.3 4191.6 22940.7
Maxim 19858.8 1965.9 17892.9 576848.2 48283.2 528564.9 26513.9 4894.8 21619.1 4788033.7 658202.1 4129831.7 18451.3 3553.8 14897.5 17122.6 2545.1 14577.5 53727.2 8596.4 45130.9
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 -0.09428 0.01669 0.00000 -0.03560 0.00649
Mean 24905.5 2470.6 22435.0 722502.3 70131.3 652371.0 33208.6 6233.7 26974.9 5997012.2 839548.8 5157463.4 23110.3 4625.4 18484.9 21446.0 3215.0 18231.1 67293.4 10766.9 56526.4
Median 24873.1 2467.3 22405.8 722502.3 70131.3 652371.0 33208.6 6233.7 26974.9 5997012.2 839548.8 5157463.4 23110.3 4625.4 18484.9 21446.0 3215.0 18231.1 67293.4 10766.9 56526.4
St.dev 2927.3 292.7 2634.6 83676.1 12551.4 71124.7 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 384.8 2098.9 7793.5 1247.0 6546.6
Minim 19958.1 1975.8 17982.3 579732.4 48715.9 531016.5 26646.4 4921.3 21725.1 4811973.9 661793.1 4150180.8 18543.6 3575.0 14968.6 17208.2 2558.3 14649.9 53995.9 8639.3 45356.5
Maxim 30025.2 2982.5 27042.7 865272.2 91546.8 773725.4 39770.8 7546.2 32224.6 7182050.6 1017304.6 6164746.0 27677.0 5675.7 22001.3 25683.8 3871.6 21812.3 80590.9 12894.5 67696.3
Skewness 0.03684 0.03684 0.03684 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Mean 35494.4 3529.4 31964.9 1010926.4 113395.0 897531.4 46465.5 8885.1 37580.4 8391029.1 1198651.4 7192377.7 32335.9 6747.3 25588.7 30007.3 4541.5 25465.8 94157.0 15065.1 79091.9
Median 35494.4 3529.4 31964.9 1010926.4 113395.0 897531.4 46465.5 8885.1 37580.4 8391029.1 1198651.4 7192377.7 32335.9 6747.3 25588.7 30007.3 4541.5 25465.8 94157.0 15065.1 79091.9
St.dev 3141.9 314.2 2827.8 83676.1 12551.4 71124.7 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 384.8 2098.9 7793.5 1247.0 6546.6
Minim 30133.5 2993.4 27140.2 868156.5 91979.5 776177.0 39903.4 7572.7 32330.7 7205990.7 1020895.6 6185095.1 27769.2 5696.9 22072.3 25769.5 3884.8 21884.6 80859.5 12937.5 67922.0
Maxim 40855.2 4065.5 36789.7 1153696.3 134810.4 1018885.9 53027.7 10197.5 42830.2 9576067.4 1376407.1 8199660.3 36902.6 7797.6 29105.0 34245.1 5198.1 29047.0 107454.5 17192.7 90261.8
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Mean 46324.4 4612.4 41711.9 1309988.1 169710.2 1140278.0 59722.5 11536.5 48186.0 10785046.0 1557753.9 9227292.1 41561.6 8869.2 32692.4 38568.6 5868.0 32700.6 121020.6 19363.3 101657.3
Median 46324.4 4612.4 41711.9 1309988.1 169710.2 1140278.0 59722.5 11536.5 48186.0 10785046.0 1557753.9 9227292.1 41561.6 8869.2 32692.4 38568.6 5868.0 32700.6 121020.6 19363.3 101657.3
St.dev 3141.9 314.2 2827.8 89787.3 20049.4 69737.9 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 384.8 2098.9 7793.5 1247.0 6546.6
Minim 40963.5 4076.4 36887.2 1156791.2 135501.5 1021289.7 53160.3 10224.1 42936.2 9600007.6 1379998.1 8220009.5 36994.9 7818.8 29176.1 34330.7 5211.4 29119.4 107723.1 17235.7 90487.4
Maxim 51685.2 5148.5 46536.7 1463185.1 203918.8 1259266.3 66284.6 12848.9 53435.7 11970084.3 1735509.6 10234574.7 46128.3 9919.5 36208.8 42806.4 6524.6 36281.8 134318.1 21490.9 112827.2
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Mean 57154.4 5695.4 51458.9 1619476.9 238818.5 1380658.4 72979.4 14187.9 58791.5 13179062.8 1916856.4 11262206.4 50787.3 10991.1 39796.2 47129.8 7194.5 39935.3 149590.1 23934.4 125655.7
Median 57154.4 5695.4 51458.9 1619476.9 238818.5 1380658.4 72979.4 14187.9 58791.5 13179062.8 1916856.4 11262206.4 50787.3 10991.1 39796.2 47129.8 7194.5 39935.3 149590.1 23934.4 125655.7
St.dev 3141.9 314.2 2827.8 89787.3 20049.4 69737.9 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 384.8 2098.9 8773.6 1403.8 7369.8
Minim 51793.5 5159.4 46634.2 1466280.0 204609.9 1261670.1 66417.2 12875.4 53541.8 11994024.5 1739100.7 10254923.8 46220.6 9940.7 36279.8 42892.0 6537.9 36354.1 134620.5 21539.3 113081.2
Maxim 62515.2 6231.5 56283.7 1772673.8 273027.2 1499646.7 79541.6 15500.3 64041.3 14364101.2 2094612.2 12269489.0 55354.0 12041.4 43312.5 51367.7 7851.2 43516.5 164559.8 26329.6 138230.2
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
S1: Employee having one dependent childStatistics
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Table 2c   Descriptive statistics for pre-tax salary income, after-tax salary income and salary income tax  
 
 
 
 
Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax
Mean 7159.6 676.0 6483.7 197078.0 0.0 197078.0 9115.6 1045.5 8070.1 1739798.4 110975.8 1628822.7 6599.7 373.7 6226.0 6191.6 516.2 5675.5 19694.3 2503.7 17190.7
Median 7159.6 676.0 6483.7 197078.0 0.0 197078.0 9115.6 1045.5 8070.1 1739798.4 110975.8 1628822.7 6599.7 344.9 6254.8 6191.6 516.2 5675.5 19694.3 2489.0 17205.3
St.dev 1623.3 162.3 1461.0 53537.1 0.0 53537.1 2427.2 485.4 1941.8 383431.4 57514.7 325916.7 1539.0 315.0 1228.9 1388.8 293.0 1095.8 4201.9 918.7 3283.8
Minim 4389.8 399.0 3990.9 105732.0 0.0 105732.0 4974.2 217.2 4757.0 1085580.0 12843.0 1072737.0 3973.8 0.0 3973.8 3822.0 16.2 3805.8 12525.0 1044.0 11481.0
Maxim 9929.4 952.9 8976.5 288424.1 0.0 288424.1 13256.9 1873.8 11383.1 2394016.9 209108.5 2184908.3 9225.7 948.9 8276.8 8561.3 1016.1 7545.1 26863.6 4094.0 22769.6
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 na 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.26514 -0.09266 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.06228 -0.01873
Mean 14943.7 1454.4 13489.4 434078.2 11464.2 422614.1 19951.7 3212.7 16738.9 3602995.4 390455.3 3212540.1 13884.6 2020.5 11864.2 12884.7 1771.6 11113.1 40429.7 6457.6 33972.1
Median 14943.7 1454.4 13489.4 434078.2 9863.7 424214.5 19951.7 3212.7 16738.9 3602995.4 390455.3 3212540.1 13884.6 2020.5 11864.2 12884.7 1780.4 11104.3 40429.7 6468.8 33961.0
St.dev 2880.7 288.1 2592.6 83676.1 10506.2 73438.6 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 398.6 2085.6 7793.5 1265.3 6528.7
Minim 10028.7 962.9 9065.8 291308.3 0.0 291308.3 13389.5 1900.3 11489.2 2417957.0 212699.6 2205257.5 9317.9 970.1 8347.8 8646.9 1034.2 7612.7 27132.3 4154.2 22978.1
Maxim 19858.8 1945.9 17912.9 576848.2 31279.2 545568.9 26513.9 4525.2 21988.7 4788033.7 568211.1 4219822.7 18451.3 3070.8 15380.5 17122.6 2437.1 14685.5 53727.2 8596.4 45130.9
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.37379 -0.07282 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 -0.09428 0.01669 0.00000 -0.04488 0.00810
Mean 24905.5 2450.6 22455.0 722502.3 53127.3 669375.0 33208.6 5864.1 27344.5 5997012.2 749557.8 5247454.4 23110.3 4142.4 18967.9 21446.0 3107.0 18339.1 67293.4 10766.9 56526.4
Median 24873.1 2447.3 22425.8 722502.3 53127.3 669375.0 33208.6 5864.1 27344.5 5997012.2 749557.8 5247454.4 23110.3 4142.4 18967.9 21446.0 3107.0 18339.1 67293.4 10766.9 56526.4
St.dev 2927.3 292.7 2634.6 83676.1 12551.4 71124.7 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 384.8 2098.9 7793.5 1247.0 6546.6
Minim 19958.1 1955.8 18002.3 579732.4 31711.9 548020.5 26646.4 4551.7 22094.7 4811973.9 571802.1 4240171.8 18543.6 3092.0 15451.6 17208.2 2450.3 14757.9 53995.9 8639.3 45356.5
Maxim 30025.2 2962.5 27062.7 865272.2 74542.8 790729.4 39770.8 7176.6 32594.2 7182050.6 927313.6 6254737.0 27677.0 5192.7 22484.3 25683.8 3763.6 21920.3 80590.9 12894.5 67696.3
Skewness 0.03684 0.03684 0.03684 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Mean 35494.4 3509.4 31984.9 1010926.4 96391.0 914535.4 46465.5 8515.5 37950.0 8391029.1 1108660.4 7282368.7 32335.9 6264.3 26071.7 30007.3 4433.5 25573.8 94157.0 15065.1 79091.9
Median 35494.4 3509.4 31984.9 1010926.4 96391.0 914535.4 46465.5 8515.5 37950.0 8391029.1 1108660.4 7282368.7 32335.9 6264.3 26071.7 30007.3 4433.5 25573.8 94157.0 15065.1 79091.9
St.dev 3141.9 314.2 2827.8 83676.1 12551.4 71124.7 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 384.8 2098.9 7793.5 1247.0 6546.6
Minim 30133.5 2973.4 27160.2 868156.5 74975.5 793181.0 39903.4 7203.1 32700.3 7205990.7 930904.6 6275086.1 27769.2 5213.9 22555.3 25769.5 3776.8 21992.6 80859.5 12937.5 67922.0
Maxim 40855.2 4045.5 36809.7 1153696.3 117806.4 1035889.9 53027.7 9827.9 43199.8 9576067.4 1286416.1 8289651.3 36902.6 7314.6 29588.0 34245.1 5090.1 29155.0 107454.5 17192.7 90261.8
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Mean 46324.4 4592.4 41731.9 1309988.1 152706.2 1157282.0 59722.5 11166.9 48555.6 10785046.0 1467762.9 9317283.1 41561.6 8386.2 33175.4 38568.6 5760.0 32808.6 121020.6 19363.3 101657.3
Median 46324.4 4592.4 41731.9 1309988.1 152706.2 1157282.0 59722.5 11166.9 48555.6 10785046.0 1467762.9 9317283.1 41561.6 8386.2 33175.4 38568.6 5760.0 32808.6 121020.6 19363.3 101657.3
St.dev 3141.9 314.2 2827.8 89787.3 20049.4 69737.9 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 384.8 2098.9 7793.5 1247.0 6546.6
Minim 40963.5 4056.4 36907.2 1156791.2 118497.5 1038293.7 53160.3 9854.5 43305.8 9600007.6 1290007.1 8310000.5 36994.9 7335.8 29659.1 34330.7 5103.4 29227.4 107723.1 17235.7 90487.4
Maxim 51685.2 5128.5 46556.7 1463185.1 186914.8 1276270.3 66284.6 12479.3 53805.3 11970084.3 1645518.6 10324565.7 46128.3 9436.5 36691.8 42806.4 6416.6 36389.8 134318.1 21490.9 112827.2
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Mean 57154.4 5675.4 51478.9 1619476.9 221814.5 1397662.4 72979.4 13818.3 59161.1 13179062.8 1826865.4 11352197.4 50787.3 10508.1 40279.2 47129.8 7086.5 40043.3 149590.1 23934.4 125655.7
Median 57154.4 5675.4 51478.9 1619476.9 221814.5 1397662.4 72979.4 13818.3 59161.1 13179062.8 1826865.4 11352197.4 50787.3 10508.1 40279.2 47129.8 7086.5 40043.3 149590.1 23934.4 125655.7
St.dev 3141.9 314.2 2827.8 89787.3 20049.4 69737.9 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 384.8 2098.9 8773.6 1403.8 7369.8
Minim 51793.5 5139.4 46654.2 1466280.0 187605.9 1278674.1 66417.2 12505.8 53911.4 11994024.5 1649109.7 10344914.8 46220.6 9457.7 36762.8 42892.0 6429.9 36462.1 134620.5 21539.3 113081.2
Maxim 62515.2 6211.5 56303.7 1772673.8 256023.2 1516650.7 79541.6 15130.7 64410.9 14364101.2 2004621.2 12359480.0 55354.0 11558.4 43795.5 51367.7 7743.2 43624.5 164559.8 26329.6 138230.2
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
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Table 2d   Descriptive statistics for pre-tax salary income, after-tax salary income and salary income tax  
 
 
 
 
Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax
Mean 7159.6 656.0 6503.7 197078.0 0.0 197078.0 9115.6 683.6 8432.0 1739798.4 0.0 1739798.4 6599.7 91.3 6508.4 6191.6 412.8 5778.8 19694.3 2374.2 17320.1
Median 7159.6 656.0 6503.7 197078.0 0.0 197078.0 9115.6 675.9 8439.7 1739798.4 0.0 1739798.4 6599.7 0.0 6599.7 6191.6 408.2 5783.5 19694.3 2356.6 17337.7
St.dev 1623.3 162.3 1461.0 53537.1 0.0 53537.1 2427.2 473.5 1954.5 383431.4 0.0 383431.4 1539.0 143.5 1423.5 1388.8 285.9 1103.5 4201.9 968.1 3234.7
Minim 4389.8 379.0 4010.9 105732.0 0.0 105732.0 4974.2 0.0 4974.2 1085580.0 0.0 1085580.0 3973.8 0.0 3973.8 3822.0 0.0 3822.0 12525.0 852.0 11673.0
Maxim 9929.4 932.9 8996.5 288424.1 0.0 288424.1 13256.9 1504.2 11752.7 2394016.9 0.0 2394016.9 9225.7 465.9 8759.8 8561.3 908.1 7653.1 26863.6 4053.2 22810.4
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 na 0.00000 0.00000 0.06989 -0.02041 0.00000 na 0.00000 0.00000 1.33268 -0.14320 0.00000 0.06968 -0.02180 0.00000 0.07035 -0.02289
Mean 14943.7 1434.4 13509.4 434078.2 8081.4 425996.9 19951.7 2843.1 17108.5 3602995.4 22105.2 3580890.2 13884.6 1537.5 12347.2 12884.7 1663.6 11221.1 40429.7 6455.4 33974.3
Median 14943.7 1434.4 13509.4 434078.2 4811.7 429266.5 19951.7 2843.1 17108.5 3602995.4 0.0 3602995.4 13884.6 1537.5 12347.2 12884.7 1672.4 11212.3 40429.7 6468.8 33961.0
St.dev 2880.7 288.1 2592.6 83676.1 8827.7 75397.0 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 37170.6 665448.5 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 398.6 2085.6 7793.5 1269.0 6525.2
Minim 10028.7 942.9 9085.8 291308.3 0.0 291308.3 13389.5 1530.7 11858.8 2417957.0 0.0 2417957.0 9317.9 487.1 8830.8 8646.9 926.2 7720.7 27132.3 4116.8 23015.5
Maxim 19858.8 1925.9 17932.9 576848.2 26227.2 550620.9 26513.9 4155.6 22358.3 4788033.7 124205.1 4663828.7 18451.3 2587.8 15863.5 17122.6 2329.1 14793.5 53727.2 8596.4 45130.9
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.63966 -0.10076 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 1.48298 -0.08376 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 -0.09428 0.01669 0.00000 -0.05432 0.00970
Mean 24905.5 2430.6 22475.0 722502.3 48075.3 674427.0 33208.6 5494.5 27714.1 5997012.2 305551.8 5691460.4 23110.3 3659.4 19450.9 21446.0 2999.0 18447.1 67293.4 10766.9 56526.4
Median 24873.1 2427.3 22445.8 722502.3 48075.3 674427.0 33208.6 5494.5 27714.1 5997012.2 305551.8 5691460.4 23110.3 3659.4 19450.9 21446.0 2999.0 18447.1 67293.4 10766.9 56526.4
St.dev 2927.3 292.7 2634.6 83676.1 12551.4 71124.7 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 384.8 2098.9 7793.5 1247.0 6546.6
Minim 19958.1 1935.8 18022.3 579732.4 26659.9 553072.5 26646.4 4182.1 22464.3 4811973.9 127796.1 4684177.8 18543.6 2609.0 15934.6 17208.2 2342.3 14865.9 53995.9 8639.3 45356.5
Maxim 30025.2 2942.5 27082.7 865272.2 69490.8 795781.4 39770.8 6807.0 32963.8 7182050.6 483307.6 6698743.0 27677.0 4709.7 22967.3 25683.8 3655.6 22028.3 80590.9 12894.5 67696.3
Skewness 0.03684 0.03684 0.03684 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Mean 35494.4 3489.4 32004.9 1010926.4 91339.0 919587.4 46465.5 8145.9 38319.6 8391029.1 664654.4 7726374.7 32335.9 5781.3 26554.7 30007.3 4325.5 25681.8 94157.0 15065.1 79091.9
Median 35494.4 3489.4 32004.9 1010926.4 91339.0 919587.4 46465.5 8145.9 38319.6 8391029.1 664654.4 7726374.7 32335.9 5781.3 26554.7 30007.3 4325.5 25681.8 94157.0 15065.1 79091.9
St.dev 3141.9 314.2 2827.8 83676.1 12551.4 71124.7 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 384.8 2098.9 7793.5 1247.0 6546.6
Minim 30133.5 2953.4 27180.2 868156.5 69923.5 798233.0 39903.4 6833.5 33069.9 7205990.7 486898.6 6719092.1 27769.2 4730.9 23038.3 25769.5 3668.8 22100.6 80859.5 12937.5 67922.0
Maxim 40855.2 4025.5 36829.7 1153696.3 112754.4 1040941.9 53027.7 9458.3 43569.4 9576067.4 842410.1 8733657.3 36902.6 6831.6 30071.0 34245.1 4982.1 29263.0 107454.5 17192.7 90261.8
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Mean 46324.4 4572.4 41751.9 1309988.1 147654.2 1162334.0 59722.5 10797.3 48925.2 10785046.0 1023756.9 9761289.1 41561.6 7903.2 33658.4 38568.6 5652.0 32916.6 121020.6 19363.3 101657.3
Median 46324.4 4572.4 41751.9 1309988.1 147654.2 1162334.0 59722.5 10797.3 48925.2 10785046.0 1023756.9 9761289.1 41561.6 7903.2 33658.4 38568.6 5652.0 32916.6 121020.6 19363.3 101657.3
St.dev 3141.9 314.2 2827.8 89787.3 20049.4 69737.9 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 384.8 2098.9 7793.5 1247.0 6546.6
Minim 40963.5 4036.4 36927.2 1156791.2 113445.5 1043345.7 53160.3 9484.9 43675.4 9600007.6 846001.1 8754006.5 36994.9 6852.8 30142.1 34330.7 4995.4 29335.4 107723.1 17235.7 90487.4
Maxim 51685.2 5108.5 46576.7 1463185.1 181862.8 1281322.3 66284.6 12109.7 54174.9 11970084.3 1201512.6 10768571.7 46128.3 8953.5 37174.8 42806.4 6308.6 36497.8 134318.1 21490.9 112827.2
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Mean 57154.4 5655.4 51498.9 1619476.9 216762.5 1402714.4 72979.4 13448.7 59530.7 13179062.8 1382859.4 11796203.4 50787.3 10025.1 40762.2 47129.8 6978.5 40151.3 149590.1 23934.4 125655.7
Median 57154.4 5655.4 51498.9 1619476.9 216762.5 1402714.4 72979.4 13448.7 59530.7 13179062.8 1382859.4 11796203.4 50787.3 10025.1 40762.2 47129.8 6978.5 40151.3 149590.1 23934.4 125655.7
St.dev 3141.9 314.2 2827.8 89787.3 20049.4 69737.9 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 384.8 2098.9 8773.6 1403.8 7369.8
Minim 51793.5 5119.4 46674.2 1466280.0 182553.9 1283726.1 66417.2 12136.2 54281.0 11994024.5 1205103.7 10788920.8 46220.6 8974.7 37245.8 42892.0 6321.9 36570.1 134620.5 21539.3 113081.2
Maxim 62515.2 6191.5 56323.7 1772673.8 250971.2 1521702.7 79541.6 14761.1 64780.5 14364101.2 1560615.2 12803486.0 55354.0 11075.4 44278.5 51367.7 7635.2 43732.5 164559.8 26329.6 138230.2
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
S4: Employee having three dependent childrenStatistics
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Table 2e   Descriptive statistics for pre-tax salary income, after-tax salary income and salary income tax  
 
 
 
Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax Pre-tax Tax After-tax
Mean 7159.6 656.0 6503.7 197078.0 0.0 197078.0 9115.6 390.3 8725.2 1739798.4 0.0 1739798.4 6599.7 0.0 6599.7 6191.6 320.9 5870.7 19694.3 2115.2 17579.1
Median 7159.6 656.0 6503.7 197078.0 0.0 197078.0 9115.6 306.3 8809.3 1739798.4 0.0 1739798.4 6599.7 0.0 6599.7 6191.6 300.2 5891.5 19694.3 2091.8 17602.5
St.dev 1623.3 162.3 1461.0 53537.1 0.0 53537.1 2427.2 382.8 2059.5 383431.4 0.0 383431.4 1539.0 0.0 1539.0 1388.8 264.5 1127.7 4201.9 1066.8 3136.5
Minim 4389.8 379.0 4010.9 105732.0 0.0 105732.0 4974.2 0.0 4974.2 1085580.0 0.0 1085580.0 3973.8 0.0 3973.8 3822.0 0.0 3822.0 12525.0 468.0 12057.0
Maxim 9929.4 932.9 8996.5 288424.1 0.0 288424.1 13256.9 1134.6 12122.3 2394016.9 0.0 2394016.9 9225.7 0.0 9225.7 8561.3 800.1 7761.1 26863.6 3971.5 22892.1
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 na 0.00000 0.00000 0.47053 -0.12066 0.00000 na 0.00000 0.00000 na 0.00000 0.00000 0.23820 -0.07517 0.00000 0.08390 -0.03169
Mean 14943.7 1434.4 13509.4 434078.2 8081.4 425996.9 19951.7 2473.5 17478.1 3602995.4 0.0 3602995.4 13884.6 1054.5 12830.2 12884.7 1555.6 11329.1 40429.7 6450.9 33978.8
Median 14943.7 1434.4 13509.4 434078.2 4811.7 429266.5 19951.7 2473.5 17478.1 3602995.4 0.0 3602995.4 13884.6 1054.5 12830.2 12884.7 1564.4 11320.3 40429.7 6468.8 33961.0
St.dev 2880.7 288.1 2592.6 83676.1 8827.7 75397.0 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 0.0 694540.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 398.6 2085.6 7793.5 1276.6 6518.1
Minim 10028.7 942.9 9085.8 291308.3 0.0 291308.3 13389.5 1161.1 12228.4 2417957.0 0.0 2417957.0 9317.9 4.1 9313.8 8646.9 818.2 7828.7 27132.3 4042.0 23090.3
Maxim 19858.8 1925.9 17932.9 576848.2 26227.2 550620.9 26513.9 3786.0 22727.9 4788033.7 0.0 4788033.7 18451.3 2104.8 16346.5 17122.6 2221.1 14901.5 53727.2 8596.4 45130.9
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.63966 -0.10076 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 na 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 -0.09428 0.01669 0.00000 -0.07361 0.01288
Mean 24905.5 2430.6 22475.0 722502.3 48075.3 674427.0 33208.6 5124.9 28083.7 5997012.2 114769.7 5882242.6 23110.3 3176.4 19933.9 21446.0 2891.0 18555.1 67293.4 10766.9 56526.4
Median 24873.1 2427.3 22445.8 722502.3 48075.3 674427.0 33208.6 5124.9 28083.7 5997012.2 107551.8 5889460.4 23110.3 3176.4 19933.9 21446.0 2891.0 18555.1 67293.4 10766.9 56526.4
St.dev 2927.3 292.7 2634.6 83676.1 12551.4 71124.7 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 94250.0 601391.2 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 384.8 2098.9 7793.5 1247.0 6546.6
Minim 19958.1 1935.8 18022.3 579732.4 26659.9 553072.5 26646.4 3812.5 22833.9 4811973.9 0.0 4811973.9 18543.6 2126.0 16417.6 17208.2 2234.3 14973.9 53995.9 8639.3 45356.5
Maxim 30025.2 2942.5 27082.7 865272.2 69490.8 795781.4 39770.8 6437.4 33333.4 7182050.6 285307.6 6896743.0 27677.0 4226.7 23450.3 25683.8 3547.6 22136.3 80590.9 12894.5 67696.3
Skewness 0.03684 0.03684 0.03684 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.23400 -0.04849 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Mean 35494.4 3489.4 32004.9 1010926.4 91339.0 919587.4 46465.5 7776.3 38689.2 8391029.1 466654.4 7924374.7 32335.9 5298.3 27037.7 30007.3 4217.5 25789.8 94157.0 15065.1 79091.9
Median 35494.4 3489.4 32004.9 1010926.4 91339.0 919587.4 46465.5 7776.3 38689.2 8391029.1 466654.4 7924374.7 32335.9 5298.3 27037.7 30007.3 4217.5 25789.8 94157.0 15065.1 79091.9
St.dev 3141.9 314.2 2827.8 83676.1 12551.4 71124.7 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 384.8 2098.9 7793.5 1247.0 6546.6
Minim 30133.5 2953.4 27180.2 868156.5 69923.5 798233.0 39903.4 6463.9 33439.5 7205990.7 288898.6 6917092.1 27769.2 4247.9 23521.3 25769.5 3560.8 22208.6 80859.5 12937.5 67922.0
Maxim 40855.2 4025.5 36829.7 1153696.3 112754.4 1040941.9 53027.7 9088.7 43939.0 9576067.4 644410.1 8931657.3 36902.6 6348.6 30554.0 34245.1 4874.1 29371.0 107454.5 17192.7 90261.8
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Mean 46324.4 4572.4 41751.9 1309988.1 147654.2 1162334.0 59722.5 10427.7 49294.8 10785046.0 825756.9 9959289.1 41561.6 7420.2 34141.4 38568.6 5544.0 33024.6 121020.6 19363.3 101657.3
Median 46324.4 4572.4 41751.9 1309988.1 147654.2 1162334.0 59722.5 10427.7 49294.8 10785046.0 825756.9 9959289.1 41561.6 7420.2 34141.4 38568.6 5544.0 33024.6 121020.6 19363.3 101657.3
St.dev 3141.9 314.2 2827.8 89787.3 20049.4 69737.9 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 384.8 2098.9 7793.5 1247.0 6546.6
Minim 40963.5 4036.4 36927.2 1156791.2 113445.5 1043345.7 53160.3 9115.3 44045.0 9600007.6 648001.1 8952006.5 36994.9 6369.8 30625.1 34330.7 4887.4 29443.4 107723.1 17235.7 90487.4
Maxim 51685.2 5108.5 46576.7 1463185.1 181862.8 1281322.3 66284.6 11740.1 54544.5 11970084.3 1003512.6 10966571.7 46128.3 8470.5 37657.8 42806.4 6200.6 36605.8 134318.1 21490.9 112827.2
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Mean 57154.4 5655.4 51498.9 1619476.9 216762.5 1402714.4 72979.4 13079.1 59900.3 13179062.8 1184859.4 11994203.4 50787.3 9542.1 41245.2 47129.8 6870.5 40259.3 149590.1 23934.4 125655.7
Median 57154.4 5655.4 51498.9 1619476.9 216762.5 1402714.4 72979.4 13079.1 59900.3 13179062.8 1184859.4 11994203.4 50787.3 9542.1 41245.2 47129.8 6870.5 40259.3 149590.1 23934.4 125655.7
St.dev 3141.9 314.2 2827.8 89787.3 20049.4 69737.9 3846.0 769.2 3076.8 694540.0 104181.0 590359.0 2676.5 615.6 2060.9 2483.8 384.8 2098.9 8773.6 1403.8 7369.8
Minim 51793.5 5119.4 46674.2 1466280.0 182553.9 1283726.1 66417.2 11766.6 54650.6 11994024.5 1007103.7 10986920.8 46220.6 8491.7 37728.8 42892.0 6213.9 36678.1 134620.5 21539.3 113081.2
Maxim 62515.2 6191.5 56323.7 1772673.8 250971.2 1521702.7 79541.6 14391.5 65150.1 14364101.2 1362615.2 13001486.0 55354.0 10592.4 44761.5 51367.7 7527.2 43840.5 164559.8 26329.6 138230.2
Skewness 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
S4: Employee having four or more dependent childrenStatistics
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Table 3 The effective tax rate  
Group Bulgaria 
Czech 
Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Romania 
  S0: employee without dependent children 
G1 10.00 2.40 15.52 15.00 19.86 11.83 13.98 
G2 10.00 9.28 17.96 15.00 21.51 15.49 16.00 
G3 10.00 11.56 18.77 15.00 22.10 15.49 16.00 
G4 10.00 12.54 19.12 15.00 22.36 15.49 16.00 
G5 10.00 13.98 19.32 15.00 22.50 15.49 16.00 
G6 10.00 15.57 19.44 15.00 22.59 15.49 16.00 
  S1: employee with one dependent child 
G1 9.7 0.0 15.5 11.6 12.5 10.1 13.3 
G2 9.9 6.2 18.0 13.3 18.0 14.7 16.0 
G3 9.9 9.7 18.8 14.0 20.0 15.0 16.0 
G4 9.9 11.2 19.1 14.3 20.9 15.1 16.0 
G5 10.0 13.0 19.3 14.4 21.3 15.2 16.0 
G6 10.0 14.7 19.4 14.5 21.6 15.3 16.0 
  S2: employee with two dependent children 
G1 9.4 0.0 11.5 6.4 5.2 8.3 12.6 
G2 9.7 2.3 16.1 10.8 14.6 13.8 16.0 
G3 9.8 7.4 17.7 12.5 17.9 14.5 16.0 
G4 9.9 9.5 18.3 13.2 19.4 14.8 16.0 
G5 9.9 11.7 18.7 13.6 20.2 14.9 16.0 
G6 9.9 13.7 18.9 13.9 20.7 15.0 16.0 
  S3: employee with three dependent children 
G1 9.2 0.0 7.4 0.0 0.0 6.6 12.0 
G2 9.6 1.1 14.3 0.0 11.1 13.0 16.0 
G3 9.8 6.7 16.5 5.1 15.8 14.0 16.0 
G4 9.8 9.0 17.5 7.9 17.9 14.4 16.0 
G5 9.9 11.3 18.1 9.5 19.0 14.7 16.0 
G6 9.9 13.4 18.4 10.5 19.7 14.8 16.0 
  S4: employee with four or more dependent children 
G1 9.2 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 4.8 10.6 
G2 9.6 1.1 12.4 0.0 7.6 12.1 16.0 
G3 9.8 6.7 15.4 1.8 13.7 13.5 16.0 
G4 9.8 9.0 16.7 5.6 16.4 14.1 16.0 
G5 9.9 11.3 17.5 7.7 17.9 14.4 16.0 
G6 9.9 13.4 17.9 9.0 18.8 14.6 16.0 
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Table 4 The Gini coefficient 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-tax After-tax % Pre-tax After-tax % Pre-tax After-tax % Pre-tax After-tax % Pre-tax After-tax % Pre-tax After-tax % Pre-tax After-tax %
G1 15.02 15.02 0.00% 17.60 16.31 -7.33% 17.30 16.48 -4.74% 14.66 14.66 0.00% 15.40 14.87 -3.44% 14.88 13.53 -9.07% 14.26 13.47 -5.54%
G2 13.07 13.07 0.00% 13.07 12.37 -5.36% 13.07 12.80 -2.07% 13.07 13.07 0.00% 13.07 12.86 -1.61% 13.07 12.99 -0.61% 13.07 13.05 -0.15%
G3 8.75 8.75 0.00% 8.65 8.39 -3.01% 8.65 8.55 -1.16% 8.65 8.65 0.00% 8.65 8.58 -0.81% 8.65 8.65 0.00% 8.65 8.65 0.00%
G4 7.08 7.08 0.00% 6.75 6.62 -1.93% 6.75 6.70 -0.74% 6.75 6.75 0.00% 6.75 6.72 -0.44% 6.75 6.75 0.00% 6.75 6.75 0.00%
G5 5.90 5.90 0.00% 5.94 5.55 -6.57% 5.70 5.67 -0.53% 5.70 5.70 0.00% 5.70 5.68 -0.35% 5.70 5.70 0.00% 5.70 5.70 0.00%
G6 5.16 5.16 0.00% 5.18 4.93 -4.83% 5.03 5.01 -0.40% 5.03 5.03 0.00% 5.03 5.01 -0.40% 5.03 5.03 0.00% 5.37 5.37 0.00%
All 32.99 32.99 0.00% 32.78 31.32 -4.45% 32.39 31.98 -1.24% 32.13 32.13 0.00% 32.20 31.90 -0.93% 32.15 31.94 -0.65% 32.28 32.17 -0.34%
G1 15.02 14.98 -0.27% 17.60 17.43 -0.97% 17.30 16.48 -4.74% 14.66 14.17 -3.34% 15.40 13.79 -10.45% 14.88 13.31 -10.55% 14.26 13.22 -7.29%
G2 13.07 13.06 -0.08% 13.07 12.03 -7.96% 13.07 12.80 -2.07% 13.07 12.86 -1.61% 13.07 12.40 -5.13% 13.07 12.89 -1.38% 13.07 13.05 -0.15%
G3 8.75 8.74 -0.11% 8.65 8.26 -4.51% 8.65 8.55 -1.16% 8.65 8.58 -0.81% 8.65 8.40 -2.89% 8.65 8.61 -0.46% 8.65 8.65 0.00%
G4 7.08 7.08 0.00% 6.75 6.55 -2.96% 6.75 6.70 -0.74% 6.75 6.71 -0.59% 6.75 6.63 -1.78% 6.75 6.73 -0.30% 6.75 6.75 0.00%
G5 5.90 5.89 -0.17% 5.94 5.51 -7.24% 5.70 5.67 -0.53% 5.70 5.68 -0.35% 5.70 5.62 -1.40% 5.70 5.69 -0.18% 5.70 5.70 0.00%
G6 5.16 5.16 0.00% 5.18 4.90 -5.41% 5.03 5.01 -0.40% 5.03 5.01 -0.40% 5.03 4.97 -1.19% 5.03 5.02 -0.20% 5.37 5.37 0.00%
All 32.99 32.96 -0.09% 32.78 30.99 -5.46% 32.39 31.98 -1.24% 32.13 31.82 -0.96% 32.20 31.21 -3.07% 32.15 31.79 -1.12% 32.28 32.13 -0.46%
G1 15.02 14.94 -0.53% 17.60 17.60 0.00% 17.30 15.82 -8.55% 14.66 13.49 -7.98% 15.40 13.33 -13.44% 14.88 13.09 -12.03% 14.26 12.97 -9.05%
G2 13.07 13.04 -0.23% 13.07 11.98 -8.34% 13.07 12.56 -3.90% 13.07 12.56 -3.90% 13.07 11.98 -8.34% 13.07 12.78 -2.22% 13.07 13.04 -0.23%
G3 8.75 8.74 -0.11% 8.65 8.10 -6.36% 8.65 8.46 -2.20% 8.65 8.46 -2.20% 8.65 8.24 -4.74% 8.65 8.57 -0.92% 8.65 8.65 0.00%
G4 7.08 7.08 0.00% 6.75 6.47 -4.15% 6.75 6.66 -1.33% 6.75 6.66 -1.33% 6.75 6.54 -3.11% 6.75 6.71 -0.59% 6.75 6.75 0.00%
G5 5.90 5.89 -0.17% 5.94 5.46 -8.08% 5.70 5.64 -1.05% 5.70 5.64 -1.05% 5.70 5.57 -2.28% 5.70 5.67 -0.53% 5.70 5.70 0.00%
G6 5.16 5.16 0.00% 5.18 4.87 -5.98% 5.03 4.99 -0.80% 5.03 4.99 -0.80% 5.03 4.94 -1.79% 5.03 5.01 -0.40% 5.37 5.37 0.00%
All 32.99 32.94 -0.15% 32.78 30.76 -6.16% 32.39 31.63 -2.32% 32.13 31.37 -2.37% 32.20 30.59 -5.00% 32.15 31.63 -1.62% 32.28 32.09 -0.59%
G1 15.02 14.90 -0.80% 17.60 17.60 0.00% 17.30 15.31 -11.50% 14.66 14.66 0.00% 15.40 14.54 -5.58% 14.88 12.97 -12.84% 14.26 12.73 -10.73%
G2 13.07 13.02 -0.38% 13.07 12.16 -6.96% 13.07 12.33 -5.66% 13.07 12.56 -3.90% 13.07 11.59 -11.32% 13.07 12.68 -2.98% 13.07 13.03 -0.31%
G3 8.75 8.73 -0.23% 8.65 8.06 -6.82% 8.65 8.38 -3.12% 8.65 7.96 -7.98% 8.65 8.09 -6.47% 8.65 8.54 -1.27% 8.65 8.65 0.00%
G4 7.08 7.08 0.00% 6.75 6.44 -4.59% 6.75 6.61 -2.07% 6.75 6.39 -5.33% 6.75 6.46 -4.30% 6.75 6.69 -0.89% 6.75 6.75 0.00%
G5 5.90 5.89 -0.17% 5.94 5.45 -8.25% 5.70 5.61 -1.58% 5.70 5.47 -4.04% 5.70 5.52 -3.16% 5.70 5.66 -0.70% 5.70 5.70 0.00%
G6 5.16 5.15 -0.19% 5.18 4.86 -6.18% 5.03 4.97 -1.19% 5.03 4.99 -0.80% 5.03 4.90 -2.58% 5.03 5.00 -0.60% 5.37 5.37 0.00%
All 32.99 32.92 -0.21% 32.78 30.72 -6.28% 32.39 31.29 -3.37% 32.13 30.45 -2.37% 32.20 30.13 -6.43% 32.15 31.49 -2.05% 32.28 32.06 -0.68%
G1 15.02 14.90 -0.80% 17.60 17.60 0.00% 17.30 15.54 -10.17% 14.66 14.66 0.00% 15.40 14.54 -5.58% 14.88 13.03 -12.43% 14.26 12.25 -14.10%
G2 13.07 13.02 -0.38% 13.07 12.16 -6.96% 13.07 12.11 -7.35% 13.07 12.56 -3.90% 13.07 11.23 -14.08% 13.07 12.57 -3.83% 13.07 13.02 -0.38%
G3 8.75 8.73 -0.23% 8.65 8.06 -6.82% 8.65 8.29 -4.16% 8.65 7.87 -9.02% 8.65 7.94 -8.21% 8.65 8.50 -1.73% 8.65 8.65 0.00%
G4 7.08 7.08 0.00% 6.75 6.44 -4.59% 6.75 6.57 -2.67% 6.75 6.28 -6.96% 6.75 6.38 -5.48% 6.75 6.67 -1.19% 6.75 6.75 0.00%
G5 5.90 5.89 -0.17% 5.94 5.45 -8.25% 5.70 5.59 -1.93% 5.70 5.41 -5.09% 5.70 5.47 -4.04% 5.70 5.65 -0.88% 5.70 5.70 0.00%
G6 5.16 5.15 -0.19% 5.18 4.86 -6.18% 5.03 4.95 -1.59% 5.03 4.83 -3.98% 5.03 4.87 -3.18% 5.03 4.99 -0.80% 5.37 5.37 0.00%
All 32.99 32.92 -0.21% 32.78 30.72 -6.28% 32.39 31.00 -4.26% 32.13 30.49 -5.10% 32.20 29.85 -7.30% 32.15 31.35 -2.49% 32.28 31.98 -0.93%
S3: employees with three dependent children
S4: employees with four and more dependent children
Group S0: employees without dependent children
S1: employees with one dependent child
S2: employees with two dependent children
LITHUANIA ROMANIACZECH REPUBLICBULGARIA HUNGARYESTONIA LATVIA
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Table 5   Income redistribution vs. tax equity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Redistribution Tax equity Redistribution Tax equity Redistribution Tax equityRedistributionTax equity Redistribution Tax equity RedistributionTax equity Redistribution Tax equity
G1 No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
G2 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
G3 No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
G4 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
G5 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
G6 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
G1 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
G2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
G3 No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
G4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
G5 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
G6 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
G1 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
G2 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
G3 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
G4 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
G5 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
G6 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
G1 Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No
G2 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
G3 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
G4 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
G5 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
G6 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
G1 Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
G2 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
G3 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
G4 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
G5 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
G6 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Total no. 18 3 27 5 30 2 22 2 30 2 26 7 10 10
Ratio 0.17 0.19 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.27 1.00
S4: employees with four and more dependent children
Groups S0: employees without dependent children
S1: employees with one dependent child
S2: employees with two dependent children
S3: employees with three dependent children
Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Romania
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Table 6   Breakdown of tax revenue by country in 2016 (% of total) 
Source: Eurostat 
